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This	  article	  draws	  on	  legal	  arguments	  made	  by	  civil	  society	  organisations	  to	  challenge	  the	  
legal	  reasoning	  that	  apparently	  produced	  the	  decision	  in	  the	  Ms	  Y	  case	  in	  August	  2014.	  	  I	  
show	  how	  legal	  standards	  of	  reasonableness	  and	  practicality	  ought	  to	  be	  interpreted	  in	  ways	  
that	  are	  respectful	  of	  the	  patient’s	  wishes	  and	  rights.	  	  The	  case	  concerned	  a	  decision	  by	  the	  
Health	  Service	  Executive	  (HSE),	  the	  Irish	  public	  health	  authority,	  to	  refuse	  an	  abortion	  to	  a	  
pregnant	  asylum	  seeker	  and	  rape	  survivor	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  a	  caesarean	  section	  and	  early	  
live	  delivery	  were	  practicable	  and	  reasonable	  alternatives	  justified	  by	  the	  need	  to	  protect	  
foetal	  life.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  abortion	  refusal	  may	  not	  have	  been	  a	  reasonable	  decision	  as	  
required	  by	  the	  terms	  of	  relevant	  legislation	  for	  four	  different	  reasons.	  	  First,	  the	  alternative	  
of	  a	  caesarean	  section	  and	  early	  live	  delivery	  was	  not	  likely	  to	  avert	  the	  risk	  of	  suicide,	  and	  in	  
fact	  did	  not	  do	  so.	  	  Second,	  the	  consent	  to	  the	  caesarean	  section	  alternative	  may	  not	  have	  
been	  a	  real	  consent	  in	  the	  legal	  sense	  if	  it	  was	  not	  voluntary.	  	  Third,	  an	  abortion	  refusal	  and	  
forcible	  treatment	  fall	  below	  the	  norms	  of	  good	  medical	  practice	  as	  interpreted	  through	  a	  
patient-­‐centred	  perspective.	  	  Fourth,	  an	  abortion	  refusal	  that	  entails	  forms	  of	  cruel,	  
inhumane	  and	  degrading	  treatment	  ought	  not	  be	  a	  ‘reasonable’	  action	  under	  the	  legislation.	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When	  cases	  like	  that	  of	  Ms	  Y	  come	  to	  public	  attention,	  they	  provoke	  outrage	  and	  dismay	  as	  
people	  respond	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  abortion	  restrictions	  on	  real	  women’s	  lives.[1]	  [2]	  How	  
could	  a	  health	  care	  system	  treat	  a	  distressed	  pregnant	  asylum-­‐seeking	  rape	  survivor	  so	  
badly?	  	  Why	  weren’t	  her	  requests	  for	  help	  in	  accessing	  an	  abortion	  acted	  on	  more	  quickly	  
and	  effectively?	  	  The	  story	  of	  Ms	  Y,	  like	  that	  of	  Savita	  Halappanavar,	  “Beatriz”,	  Sarah	  Catt	  [3]	  
[4]	  [5]	  and	  many	  other	  women	  before	  her,	  draw	  people	  into	  the	  international	  struggle	  for	  
reproductive	  rights.	  	  But	  they	  also	  remind	  us	  of	  the	  harsh	  effects	  of	  the	  legal	  gaze	  on	  
individual	  women.	  	  As	  this	  issue	  of	  RHM	  reflects	  on	  the	  use	  of	  law,	  I	  want	  to	  consider	  how	  
we	  might	  pull	  that	  gaze	  away	  from	  the	  scrutiny	  of	  individual	  women	  like	  Ms	  Y.	  	  How	  can	  we	  
draw	  on	  civil	  society	  engagements	  with	  sexual	  and	  reproductive	  rights	  to	  redirect	  that	  gaze	  
so	  that	  it	  lights	  up	  more	  respectful	  pathways	  for	  all	  abortion-­‐seekers?	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Ms	  Y	  had	  the	  full	  force	  of	  law	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  her	  reproductive	  body	  as	  a	  caesarean	  
section	  was	  performed	  on	  her	  at	  25	  weeks	  gestation	  in	  spite	  of	  her	  request	  for	  an	  abortion.	  
[6]	  [7]	  [8]	  The	  denial	  of	  her	  request	  to	  control	  her	  reproductive	  life	  is	  problematic	  enough,	  
but	  this	  response	  seems	  particularly	  cruel.[9]	  	  How	  could	  a	  public	  responsibility	  to	  care	  
become	  a	  licence	  to	  torment?	  Why	  have	  feminist	  advocates,	  activists	  and	  academics	  not	  
been	  more	  successful	  in	  changing	  practice,	  policy	  and	  law?	  	  Irish	  society	  found	  itself	  asking	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these	  questions	  a	  year	  after	  the	  adoption	  of	  its	  first	  abortion	  legislation[10]	  and	  almost	  two	  
years	  after	  the	  death	  of	  Savita	  Halappanavar.[11]	  [12]	  	  In	  this	  article	  I	  want	  to	  identify	  some	  
of	  the	  problematic	  forms	  of	  legal	  thinking	  that	  have	  led	  the	  Irish	  state	  down	  this	  path	  and	  
suggest	  alternative	  routes	  that	  might	  have	  been,	  and	  might	  yet	  be,	  taken.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  I	  will	  
draw	  on	  legal	  arguments	  that	  have	  been	  made	  across	  Irish	  civil	  society	  for	  many	  years,	  [13]	  
[14]	  but	  do	  not	  yet	  seem	  to	  have	  permeated	  state	  thinking	  yet.[15]	  	  
	  
As	  of	  the	  end	  of	  October,	  we	  have	  no	  official	  record	  of	  what	  happened	  and	  are	  still	  reliant	  
on	  journalistic	  accounts.[16]	  The	  Health	  Service	  Executive	  has	  set	  up	  an	  inquiry	  to	  
investigate	  the	  factual	  circumstances	  of	  this	  case,	  which	  was	  initially	  due	  to	  report	  by	  the	  
end	  of	  September	  but	  has	  been	  delayed.[17]	  [18]	  There	  was	  a	  High	  Court	  hearing	  which	  
gave	  an	  order	  permitting	  the	  forcible	  hydration	  of	  the	  pregnant	  woman,	  but	  it	  has	  not	  been	  
officially	  reported.	  [6]	  [16]	  The	  HSE	  report	  should	  provide	  us	  with	  a	  fuller	  picture	  of	  the	  
factual	  details	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  this	  case,	  while	  protecting	  the	  anonymity	  of	  Ms	  Y.	  	  But	  it	  is	  
worth	  noting	  that	  this	  process	  of	  investigation	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  found	  wanting	  as	  a	  form	  of	  
inquiry	  into	  possible	  wrongdoing	  to	  patients.	  	  
	  
The	  report	  itself	  has	  been	  limited	  to	  identifying	  the	  factual	  circumstances	  of	  Ms	  Y’s	  
treatment.	  	  There	  is	  to	  be	  no	  investigation	  of	  the	  clinical	  decisions	  themselves	  and	  no	  
qualitative	  appraisal	  of	  the	  standard	  of	  care	  provided	  to	  Ms	  Y.	  	  A	  second	  problem	  concerns	  
the	  process	  of	  producing	  the	  report.	  	  If	  inquiries	  into	  health	  care	  problems	  are	  to	  have	  
legitimacy,	  they	  need	  to	  hear	  the	  evidence	  of	  those	  who	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  wronged.	  	  
According	  to	  media	  accounts,	  the	  report	  was	  drafted	  and	  circulated	  to	  relevant	  agencies	  
before	  Ms	  Y	  and	  her	  legal	  representatives	  were	  consulted.[19]	  [20]	  	  As	  a	  result	  the	  HSE	  
report	  into	  Ms	  Y’s	  case	  looks	  like	  it	  will	  adopt	  some	  of	  the	  poor	  reporting	  practices	  evident	  in	  
other	  investigations	  into	  women’s	  historical	  mistreatment.[21]	  [22]	  [23]	  Given	  the	  
limitations	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  report,	  a	  number	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations	  have	  called	  for	  
an	  independent	  inquiry	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  that	  conducted	  into	  the	  circumstances	  
surrounding	  Savita	  Halappanavar’s	  death.[24]	  	  	  	  
	  
In	  any	  case,	  the	  basic	  facts	  that	  seem	  to	  have	  given	  rise	  to	  this	  problematic	  decision	  to	  
refuse	  an	  abortion	  appear	  to	  be	  the	  following.	  	  Ms	  Y	  found	  out	  that	  she	  was	  pregnant	  
shortly	  after	  arriving	  into	  Ireland	  as	  an	  asylum	  seeker.	  	  She	  was	  staying	  in	  Ireland’s	  much-­‐
critiqued	  system	  of	  ‘direct	  provision’	  for	  asylum	  seekers	  [25]	  when	  she	  discovered	  that	  she	  
was	  about	  8	  weeks	  pregnant	  during	  a	  medical	  examination.	  [16]	  [18]	  Her	  pregnancy	  has	  
resulted	  from	  rape	  in	  her	  home	  country	  and	  she	  said	  that	  the	  pregnancy	  was	  very	  hard	  to	  
bear.	  	  She	  was	  clearly	  distressed	  and	  made	  her	  wish	  to	  have	  an	  abortion	  known.	  	  Given	  her	  
status	  as	  an	  asylum	  seeker,	  she	  would	  have	  been	  trying	  to	  find	  out	  about	  abortion	  while	  
negotiating	  with	  various	  state	  and	  independent	  agencies	  on	  an	  income	  of	  £19	  a	  week,	  with	  
no	  knowledge	  of	  how	  things	  work	  in	  Ireland,	  with	  little	  in	  the	  way	  of	  a	  support	  network,	  and	  
with	  no	  freedom	  of	  movement	  given	  her	  precarious	  migration	  status.	  [26]	  [27]	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  
In	  the	  Republic	  of	  Ireland,	  [28]	  [29]	  when	  women	  such	  as	  Ms	  Y	  are	  considering	  abortion	  they	  
have	  three	  options.	  	  Like	  abortion-­‐seeking	  women	  the	  world	  over,	  they	  solve	  their	  problem	  
by	  travelling	  to	  another	  jurisdiction	  where	  abortion	  is	  more	  accessible.	  [30]	  [31]	  	  Irish	  
women	  usually	  travel	  to	  the	  UK	  but	  also	  to	  other	  countries	  such	  as	  the	  Netherlands.	  	  
Feminist	  volunteers	  and	  service	  providers	  have	  organised	  to	  support	  them	  at	  home	  and	  
away.	  [32]	  [33]	  [34]	  	  Secondly,	  women	  order	  the	  abortion	  pill	  online	  from	  services	  such	  as	  
Women	  on	  Web,	  [35]	  but	  usually	  have	  to	  make	  arrangements	  to	  travel	  to	  Northern	  Ireland	  
to	  collect	  it	  at	  a	  post	  office	  or	  equivalent.	  	  This	  is	  because	  customs	  in	  the	  Republic	  have	  the	  
power	  to	  seize	  the	  pill.	  	  Supply	  of	  prescription	  medicines	  by	  mail	  order	  is	  a	  criminal	  offence	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under	  the	  control	  of	  medicines	  legislation.[36]	  Thirdly,	  women	  in	  Ireland	  can	  now	  try	  and	  
access	  domestic	  abortion	  care	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  their	  life	  is	  at	  risk	  under	  the	  newly	  
adopted	  Protection	  of	  Life	  During	  Pregnancy	  Act	  2013	  (PLDPA).[10]	  	  When	  the	  news	  broke	  
about	  Ms	  Y	  (originally	  referred	  to	  as	  Migrant	  X),	  it	  was	  because	  she	  seemed	  to	  have	  been	  
refused	  an	  abortion	  under	  the	  PLDPA.	  	  It	  later	  transpired	  that	  Ms	  Y	  had	  travelled	  to	  the	  UK	  
for	  abortion	  care	  before	  being	  referred	  to	  the	  HSE	  panel	  under	  the	  PLDPA,	  but	  had	  been	  
turned	  back	  by	  UK	  authorities.	  [37]	  	  	  
	  
The	  trials	  endured	  by	  one	  brave	  woman	  as	  she	  sought	  out	  a	  way	  to	  control	  her	  life	  have	  
illustrated,	  all	  too	  painfully,	  failures	  in	  the	  treatment	  of	  pregnant	  women	  and	  of	  precarious	  
migrants.	  [38]	  [27]	  [39]	  This	  case	  laid	  bare	  all	  the	  concerns	  which	  organisations	  including	  the	  
Irish	  Human	  Rights	  Commission,	  [40]	  the	  Irish	  Family	  Planning	  Association	  [41]	  and	  Doctors	  
for	  Choice,	  [42]	  and	  had	  raised	  previously	  about	  the	  harmful	  and	  discriminatory	  effects	  of	  
abortion	  law.	  	  How	  are	  women	  supposed	  to	  access	  life-­‐saving	  abortion	  care	  when	  that	  
requires	  the	  negotiation	  of	  a	  complex	  and	  heavily	  restricted	  health	  care	  pathway,	  or	  costly	  
travel	  to	  another	  jurisdiction,	  travel	  which	  is	  visa-­‐dependent	  for	  non-­‐EU	  citizens?	  As	  the	  
UNHRC	  noted	  in	  July	  2014,	  Ireland’s	  reliance	  on	  abortion	  travel	  has	  significant	  discriminatory	  
effects.	  [43][44]	  	  Here	  however	  I	  want	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  decision	  to	  deny	  her	  an	  abortion	  
under	  the	  PLDPA.	  	  	  
	  
Ms	  Y	  was	  likely	  to	  have	  been	  one	  of	  the	  first	  women	  to	  have	  her	  case	  assessed	  by	  a	  panel	  
convened	  under	  section	  9	  of	  the	  PLDPA.	  	  This	  Act	  was	  adopted	  in	  July	  2013	  and	  came	  into	  
force	  in	  January	  2014	  in	  response	  to	  the	  legal	  decision	  by	  the	  ECtHR	  in	  Ireland	  v	  ABC	  [45]	  and	  
to	  political	  pressure	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  outrage	  at	  the	  death	  of	  Savita	  Halappanavar	  in	  a	  
Galway	  hospital	  in	  October	  2012.	  [11][12]	  Women	  in	  Ireland	  have	  had	  an	  explicit	  
constitutional	  right	  to	  life-­‐saving	  abortion	  since	  the	  Attorney	  General	  v	  X	  decision	  in	  
1992.[46]	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  said	  that	  Article	  40	  3	  3	  of	  the	  Irish	  Constitution	  (adopted	  by	  
the	  Eighth	  Amendment	  in	  1983)	  authorised	  a	  termination	  of	  pregnancy	  when	  there	  was	  a	  
‘real	  and	  substantial	  risk’	  to	  a	  pregnant	  woman’s	  life	  as	  distinct	  from	  her	  health,	  including	  a	  
risk	  of	  self-­‐destruction.	  [47]	  But	  women	  have	  had	  no	  clear	  and	  effective	  means	  of	  
implementing	  that	  constitutional	  right	  and	  accessing	  such	  care.	  	  This	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  the	  
ECtHR	  found	  that	  C’s	  Art	  8	  rights	  had	  been	  violated.[45]	  	  She	  had	  a	  domestic	  right	  to	  life-­‐
saving	  abortion	  given	  her	  treatment	  for	  cancer	  was	  being	  compromised	  by	  her	  pregnancy,	  
but	  could	  not	  access	  domestic	  abortion	  care	  and	  travelled	  abroad	  instead.	  	  
	  
As	  Murray	  and	  Enright	  have	  commented,	  [48][49]	  the	  public	  debate	  over	  the	  PLDPA	  was	  
frustratingly	  narrow.	  	  In	  spite	  of	  efforts	  to	  open	  the	  public	  debate	  up	  towards	  a	  broader	  
approach	  to	  the	  value	  of	  life,	  commentary	  focused	  on	  the	  risk	  of	  suicide	  ground.	  	  The	  
government,	  referring	  to	  an	  Attorney	  General	  opinion,	  argued	  that	  further	  liberalisation	  of	  
abortion	  law	  was	  not	  possible	  within	  the	  parameters	  of	  Article	  40	  3	  3,	  but	  did	  not	  publish	  
that	  opinion	  or	  the	  reasons	  underpinning	  it.	  [50]	  Some	  academics	  argued	  alongside	  the	  
campaigning	  group,	  Termination	  for	  Medical	  Reasons,[51]	  that	  it	  should	  be	  possible	  to	  
legislate	  for	  abortion	  in	  the	  context	  of	  fatal	  foetal	  anomalies	  (FFA)	  [52]	  [53]	  [54]	  under	  the	  
current	  constitutional	  framework.	  	  They	  drew	  on	  the	  Irish	  government’s	  own	  argument	  
before	  the	  ECtHR	  in	  D	  v	  Ireland	  –	  that	  the	  right	  to	  life	  of	  the	  ‘unborn’	  may	  not	  be	  engaged	  
when	  a	  foetus	  is	  incompatible	  with	  life	  -­‐	  in	  doing	  so	  [55].	  	  Some	  TDs	  (Teachta	  Dala	  or	  
Member	  of	  the	  Dáil,	  the	  directly	  elected	  house	  of	  parliament)	  proposed	  amendments	  which	  
would	  have	  included	  termination	  in	  cases	  of	  FFA,	  but	  they	  were	  not	  accepted	  [56].	  	  In	  the	  
end,	  the	  PLDPA	  was	  adopted	  providing	  for	  the	  authorisation	  of	  a	  termination	  of	  pregnancy	  
in	  three	  different	  sets	  of	  circumstances,	  in	  cases	  of	  emergency	  under	  section	  8,	  cases	  of	  a	  
risk	  of	  loss	  of	  life	  from	  physical	  illness	  under	  section	  7	  and	  cases	  of	  a	  risk	  of	  loss	  of	  life	  from	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suicide	  under	  section	  9.[10]	  	  The	  grounds	  require	  one,	  two	  and	  three	  doctors’	  authorisation	  
respectively.	  	  Ms	  Y’s	  circumstances	  of	  distress	  and	  reported	  suicide	  attempt	  at	  16	  weeks	  
gestation	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  claim	  to	  abortion	  under	  section	  9.	  	  	  
	  
Newspaper	  reports	  suggest	  that	  a	  HSE	  panel	  of	  two	  psychiatrists	  and	  one	  obstetrician	  was	  
formed	  to	  consider	  Ms	  Y’s	  case	  for	  an	  abortion	  under	  section	  9.[16]	  	  They	  made	  a	  decision	  at	  
about	  20	  weeks	  gestation,	  or	  around	  12	  weeks	  after	  she	  first	  presented	  to	  health	  services.	  	  
The	  panel	  found	  that	  her	  life	  was	  at	  risk,	  but	  they	  did	  not	  authorize	  an	  abortion.	  	  Instead	  it	  
put	  in	  motion	  a	  process,	  which	  would	  culminate	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	  a	  live	  child	  by	  Caesarean	  
section	  at	  about	  25	  weeks	  gestation	  and	  included	  a	  High	  Court	  order	  to	  hydrate	  Ms	  Y	  who	  
went	  on	  hunger	  strike	  in	  response	  to	  the	  denial	  of	  her	  request.	  	  	  
	  
The	  legislative	  framework	  underpinning	  this	  decision	  has	  been	  supplemented	  by	  
implementing	  Guidelines.[57]	  	  A	  penultimate	  version	  of	  the	  latter	  had	  been	  circulated	  to	  
‘relevant	  agencies’	  over	  the	  summer	  of	  2014	  but	  not	  made	  publicly	  available,	  and	  was	  
published	  by	  the	  Guardian	  in	  August.[58]	  	  The	  final	  version	  was	  officially	  published	  on	  the	  
HSE	  website	  on	  19	  September	  about	  2	  months	  after	  the	  decision	  in	  Ms	  Y,	  with	  some	  
significant	  changes.[59]	  	  In	  the	  final	  version,	  ‘termination	  of	  pregnancy’	  includes	  early	  live	  
delivery	  by	  induction	  or	  caesarean	  section,	  in	  an	  interesting	  bit	  of	  legal	  redefinition.	  	  In	  the	  
penultimate	  version,	  early	  induction	  or	  caesarean	  section	  was	  deemed	  to	  fall	  outside	  of	  the	  
Act.	  	  In	  any	  case,	  section	  9	  and	  the	  Guidelines	  currently	  require	  that	  the	  three	  medical	  
practitioners	  jointly	  certify	  in	  good	  faith	  that	  “there	  is	  a	  real	  and	  substantial	  risk	  of	  loss	  of	  
the	  woman’s	  life	  by	  way	  of	  suicide”,	  that	  the	  “risk	  can	  only	  be	  averted	  by	  carrying	  out	  the	  
medical	  procedure”	  and	  that	  “they	  have	  regard	  to	  the	  need	  to	  preserve	  unborn	  human	  life	  
as	  far	  as	  practicable”.	  The	  legislation	  is	  silent	  on	  the	  question	  of	  gestational	  age,	  but	  the	  
Guidelines	  provide	  that	  early	  delivery	  by	  way	  of	  induction	  or	  caesarean	  section	  may	  be	  the	  
most	  appropriate	  procedure	  (6.4).	  	  
	  
To	  justify	  the	  decision	  to	  deny	  an	  abortion	  under	  section	  9,	  the	  HSE	  appointed	  panel	  must	  
have	  decided	  that	  an	  abortion	  was	  not	  the	  only	  reasonable	  way	  of	  averting	  the	  risk	  to	  the	  
woman’s	  life,	  given	  the	  need	  to	  preserve	  ‘unborn’	  human	  life	  as	  far	  as	  practicable.	  	  Her	  
constitutional	  right	  to	  a	  life-­‐sustaining	  abortion	  was	  engaged,	  but	  outweighed	  by	  the	  
possibility	  of	  delivering	  a	  live	  child.	  	  Their	  grounds	  for	  refusing	  this	  life-­‐saving	  abortion	  seem	  
to	  have	  been	  that	  they	  thought	  it	  was	  reasonable	  to	  perform	  serious	  abdominal	  surgery	  on	  a	  
woman	  against	  her	  wishes	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  the	  life	  of	  the	  foetus.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  this	  legal	  
interpretation	  tolerates	  treatment	  against	  the	  wishes	  of	  a	  pregnant	  woman	  who	  has	  a	  
constitutional	  right	  to	  life-­‐saving	  abortion	  is	  problematic	  enough.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  it	  does	  so	  in	  
circumstances	  where	  that	  woman	  is	  very	  distressed,	  a	  rape	  survivor,	  an	  asylum	  seeker	  and	  
living	  in	  circumstances	  which	  justify	  additional	  support	  rather	  than	  added	  violation,	  is	  deeply	  
worrying.	  	  	  
	  
Although	  the	  woman	  is	  reported	  as	  having	  ultimately	  consented	  to	  the	  caesarean	  section,	  it	  
is	  also	  reported	  that	  she	  did	  not	  consent	  initially	  and	  that	  the	  HSE	  were	  preparing	  to	  ask	  for	  
a	  High	  Court	  order	  authorizing	  the	  caesarean	  section.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  performance	  of	  a	  
caesarean	  section	  against	  her	  wishes	  was	  clearly	  anticipated	  as	  the	  reasonable	  and	  
practicable	  alternative	  to	  an	  abortion,	  an	  alternative	  which	  justified	  refusal	  of	  that	  abortion.	  	  
As	  Maeve	  Taylor	  of	  the	  Irish	  Family	  Planning	  Association	  pointed	  out	  to	  me,	  this	  HSE	  
interpretation	  appears	  to	  have	  narrowed	  the	  scope	  of	  a	  woman’s	  constitutional	  right	  to	  life-­‐
saving	  abortion	  under	  the	  X	  case.	  	  The	  section	  9	  test	  as	  implemented	  by	  the	  Guidelines	  has	  
required	  that	  abortion	  be	  the	  only	  means	  of	  saving	  the	  woman’s	  biological	  life	  in	  a	  manner	  
 5 
which	  adds	  another	  procedural	  barrier	  to	  the	  exercise	  of	  a	  woman’s	  right	  under	  Article	  40	  3	  
3	  and	  may	  entail	  cruel,	  inhuman	  and	  degrading	  treatment	  in	  the	  forms	  of	  forcible	  treatment.	  	  	  
	  
This	  is	  the	  first	  troubling	  aspect	  of	  this	  case	  from	  a	  legal	  perspective.	  	  There	  weren’t	  many	  
optimistic	  moments	  during	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  PLDPA	  [48]	  [49].	  	  But	  occasionally	  some	  of	  
those	  involved	  clung	  on	  to	  the	  hope	  that	  at	  minimum	  the	  Act	  would	  enhance	  women’s	  
procedural	  rights	  to	  have	  their	  abortion	  requests	  heard	  in	  a	  life-­‐saving	  context	  [see	  further	  
60].	  	  	  This	  case	  however	  seems	  to	  have	  delivered	  on	  our	  more	  pessimistic	  interpretations	  of	  
those	  procedural	  rights.	  	  	  The	  abortion	  approval/refusal	  process	  may	  in	  itself	  harm	  women	  
by	  subjecting	  them	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  judgmental	  scrutiny	  which	  produces	  mental	  anguish.	  	  
	  
Irish	  civil	  society	  voiced	  this	  concern	  to	  the	  Oireachtas	  (or	  Irish	  Parliament,	  for	  non-­‐Irish	  
speakers)	  before	  the	  Act	  was	  adopted,	  to	  the	  UNHRC	  in	  July	  2014	  a	  year	  after	  the	  Act	  was	  
passed,	  and	  to	  the	  media	  all	  the	  time.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  national	  statutory	  body	  responsible	  for	  
human	  rights	  promotion	  and	  protection,	  the	  Irish	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  [40],	  noted	  
that	  the	  Bill	  could	  be	  in	  breach	  of	  human	  rights	  norms	  for	  failure	  to	  provide	  effective	  and	  
accessible	  procedures	  for	  protecting	  the	  right	  to	  life	  of	  vulnerable	  women	  and	  girls.	  	  The	  
UNHRC	  expressed	  concern	  that	  the	  panels	  entail	  ‘excessive	  scrutiny’	  in	  breach	  of	  civil	  and	  
political	  rights.	  [44	  para	  9]	  	  At	  minimum,	  the	  HSE	  needs	  to	  revisit	  interpretation	  of	  the	  test	  
under	  section	  9,	  as	  interpreted	  by	  the	  Guidelines,	  in	  order	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  ECtHR	  
decision	  in	  ABC.[45]	  	  They	  need	  to	  ensure	  that	  women’s	  procedural	  rights	  deliver	  on	  the	  
purpose	  for	  which	  they	  were	  intended:	  the	  provision	  of	  life-­‐saving	  abortion	  care	  to	  women	  
at	  risk	  of	  suicide	  in	  a	  manner	  which	  respects	  their	  Convention	  rights	  to	  private	  life	  and	  
freedom	  from	  discrimination.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  second	  troubling	  aspect	  of	  this	  abortion	  refusal	  is	  that	  it	  reiterates	  just	  how	  unethical	  
and	  rights-­‐violating	  the	  substance	  of	  Irish	  abortion	  law	  is.	  	  Irish	  abortion	  law	  imposes	  cruel,	  
inhuman	  and	  degrading	  treatment	  (CIDT),	  violates	  integrity	  and	  autonomy,	  discriminates	  
against	  women	  in	  general,	  and	  against	  women	  with	  mental	  health	  issues,	  women	  with	  few	  
economic	  resources	  and	  women	  with	  limited	  mobility	  options,	  in	  particular.	  It	  does	  all	  this	  to	  
conscious,	  sentient,	  thinking,	  feeling	  pregnant	  people	  in	  the	  name	  of	  protecting	  unconscious	  
and	  non-­‐sentient	  life	  forms	  in	  one	  of	  the	  more	  spectacular	  examples	  of	  upside-­‐down	  
thinking	  in	  human	  rights	  discourse	  (for	  an	  example	  see	  Binchy,	  [61]	  for	  a	  critique	  of	  this	  kind	  
of	  thinking	  see	  Rodley[62]).	  	  I	  won’t	  address	  this	  point	  further	  here,	  but	  see	  any	  one	  of	  the	  
six	  pro-­‐choice	  civil	  society	  submissions	  to	  the	  UNHRC	  for	  the	  July	  2014	  hearings	  for	  
arguments	  and	  evidence	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  human	  rights	  violations	  performed	  by	  Irish	  
abortion	  law.	  [14]	  There	  is	  ample	  evidence	  of	  past	  and	  continued	  efforts	  to	  push	  the	  state	  
further	  towards	  harm	  reduction	  and	  rights	  promotion	  in	  this	  context	  and	  many	  others.	  	  But	  
right	  now,	  the	  state	  is	  not	  listening.	  	  	  
	  
A	  third	  troubling	  aspect,	  and	  the	  main	  point	  I	  want	  to	  focus	  on	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  article	  is	  the	  
panel’s	  apparent	  views	  of	  what	  counts	  as	  ‘reasonable	  and	  practicable	  treatment’	  of	  women	  
who	  are	  pregnant,	  at	  risk	  of	  suicide,	  survivors	  of	  rape,	  possibly	  incapacitated	  and	  of	  
precarious	  migration	  status.	  They	  must	  have	  decided	  that	  abortion	  was	  not	  the	  only	  means	  
of	  averting	  the	  risk	  to	  Y’s	  life	  under	  section	  9	  and	  that	  the	  gestational	  stage	  meant	  that	  a	  
caesarean	  section	  was	  ‘the	  best	  course	  of	  action’	  under	  the	  Guidelines.	  	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  
that	  the	  HSE	  panel	  may	  well	  have	  been	  legally	  wrong	  in	  its	  assumptions	  about	  what	  counts	  
as	  reasonable	  and	  practicable	  treatment,	  and	  the	  best	  course	  of	  action	  (hereinafter	  referred	  
to	  collectively	  as	  ‘reasonable’)	  for	  the	  following	  four	  reasons:	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1.	  	  The	  abortion	  refusal	  may	  not	  have	  been	  reasonable	  because	  it	  was	  not	  likely	  to	  avert	  the	  
risk	  of	  suicide	  and	  in	  fact	  did	  not	  avert	  that	  risk.	  	  	  
	  
As	  Doctors	  for	  Choice	  have	  consistently	  argued,	  [63]	  the	  evidence	  of	  an	  obstetrician	  is	  not	  
relevant	  to	  the	  assessment	  of	  suicide	  risk,	  and	  operates	  as	  a	  barrier	  to	  access	  on	  this	  ground.	  	  
In	  the	  context	  of	  suicide	  risk,	  where	  the	  woman	  is	  severely	  distressed	  by	  her	  unwanted	  
pregnancy	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  being	  denied	  an	  abortion,	  treatment	  options	  such	  as	  C	  
section	  and	  early	  delivery,	  are	  not	  likely	  to	  address	  her	  distress	  and	  reduce	  risk.	  	  A	  C	  section	  
may	  be	  a	  reasonable	  treatment	  option	  in	  cases	  of	  physical	  threat,	  if	  the	  woman	  wants,	  and	  
is	  not	  threatened	  by,	  a	  live	  delivery.	  	  But	  it	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  a	  reasonable	  option	  in	  cases	  of	  
mental	  anguish	  and	  suicide	  risk.	  	  	  
	   	  
If	  the	  offer	  of	  a	  caesarean	  was	  unlikely	  to	  avert	  the	  risk	  of	  suicide	  and	  the	  threat	  to	  the	  
woman’s	  life,	  it	  was	  not	  a	  reasonable	  or	  practicable	  way	  of	  vindicating	  her	  right	  to	  life	  with	  
due	  regard	  to	  the	  unborn’s	  right	  to	  life.	  	  And	  indeed	  this	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  born	  out	  by	  the	  
consequences	  of	  the	  refusal.	  	  Rather	  than	  experience	  some	  relief	  from	  her	  distress,	  her	  
distress	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  exacerbated	  as	  she	  turned	  to	  hunger	  strike	  as	  a	  means	  of	  
making	  herself	  heard.	  	  In	  going	  on	  hunger	  strike,	  she	  was	  acting	  on	  her	  threat	  of	  suicide.	  	  The	  
risk	  to	  her	  life,	  which	  the	  HSE	  had	  an	  obligation	  to	  reduce,	  eventuated	  in	  the	  form	  of	  acts	  of	  
self-­‐harm	  through	  the	  refusal	  of	  food	  and	  water.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  
Given	  this	  key	  legal	  and	  clinical	  distinction	  between	  kinds	  of	  life-­‐risk,	  which	  require	  different	  
kinds	  of	  clinical	  expertise	  in	  their	  assessment,	  the	  best	  way	  to	  interpret	  the	  Guidelines	  would	  
have	  been	  to	  read	  them	  narrowly	  as	  applying	  only	  to	  those	  rare	  cases	  where	  a	  suicidal	  
woman’s	  distress	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  alleviated	  by	  caesarean	  section	  and	  early	  delivery,	  because	  
this	  accords	  with	  her	  wishes.	  	  Otherwise	  the	  Guidelines	  have	  introduced	  a	  foetal	  viability	  
criterion	  as	  a	  way	  of	  limiting	  the	  scope	  of	  a	  woman’s	  right	  to	  abortion	  due	  to	  suicide	  risk,	  in	  
a	  manner	  which	  is	  not	  authorized	  by	  the	  legislation	  or	  the	  X	  case	  precedent.	  	  	  
	  
In	  X,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  decided	  that	  when	  there	  is	  a	  direct	  conflict	  between	  a	  woman’s	  
right	  to	  biological	  life	  and	  a	  foetal	  right	  to	  biological	  life,	  the	  woman’s	  has	  to	  take	  
precedence.	  	  The	  court	  was	  silent	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  this	  was	  limited	  by	  gestation.	  	  I	  
would	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  unreasonable	  to	  think	  of	  it	  as	  limited	  by	  gestation	  because	  a	  woman’s	  
life	  should	  always	  trump	  a	  foetus’s	  life	  in	  situations	  of	  conflict.	  [53]	  [64]	  [65]	  	  Of	  course	  it	  is	  
possible,	  likely	  even,	  that	  a	  court	  might	  decide	  differently	  on	  the	  length	  of	  gestation	  issue,	  as	  
de	  Londras	  and	  Graham	  have	  argued.	  [66]	  	  But	  I	  think	  there	  are	  strong	  legal	  and	  ethical	  
arguments	  for	  avoiding	  such	  an	  interpretation	  since	  it	  would	  still	  require	  sustenance	  until	  
viability	  and	  performance	  of	  serious	  surgery,	  against	  the	  woman’s	  will.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
2.	  	  The	  abortion	  refusal	  on	  grounds	  of	  the	  C	  section	  alternative	  may	  not	  have	  been	  
reasonable,	  because	  the	  C	  section	  was	  not	  a	  real,	  voluntary	  alternative	  for	  the	  woman	  in	  this	  
case.	  	  	  
	  
The	  apparent	  consent	  to	  the	  C	  section	  may	  not	  have	  been	  ‘real’	  in	  the	  legal	  sense,	  
potentially	  rendering	  the	  C	  section	  a	  trespass	  on	  the	  person	  for	  which	  the	  state	  could	  be	  
liable	  in	  civil	  law.	  	  In	  Fitzpatrick	  and	  another	  v	  K	  and	  another	  [2008]	  IEHC	  104,	  Laffoy	  J	  cites	  
Walsh	  J	  in	  G	  v	  An	  Bord	  Uchtala	  [1980]	  IR	  32	  (SC)	  in	  emphasizing	  “that	  to	  be	  valid	  the	  consent	  
must	  be	  ‘free	  and	  willing’,	  in	  other	  words	  it	  must	  be	  voluntary”.[67]	  	  K	  turned	  on	  issues	  of	  
capacity	  in	  the	  context	  of	  treatment	  refusal,	  so	  these	  comments	  are	  obiter	  dicta	  (non-­‐
binding	  asides).	  	  	  But	  they	  are	  an	  articulation	  of	  the	  generally	  accepted	  legal	  rule	  that	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consent	  needs	  to	  be	  voluntary,	  as	  well	  as	  informed	  and	  capacitated,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  valid.	  [68]	  
[69]	  	  
	  
On	  the	  assumed	  facts,	  there	  seem	  to	  be	  two	  reasons	  why	  this	  woman’s	  apparent	  consent	  
may	  not	  meet	  the	  legal	  test	  of	  voluntariness.	  	  First,	  the	  HSE	  had	  already	  got	  an	  order	  for	  
forcible	  hydration.	  	  Second,	  the	  HSE	  was	  planning	  on	  seeking	  an	  order	  for	  a	  caesarean	  
section,	  if	  she	  did	  not	  consent.	  	  Asking	  someone	  to	  consent	  to	  a	  caesarean	  section	  in	  these	  
circumstances	  seems	  like	  an	  invocation	  of	  a	  superficial	  ‘tick	  box’	  exercise,	  rather	  than	  the	  
execution	  of	  legally	  meaningful	  consent.	  Could	  her	  consent	  have	  been	  free	  and	  willing	  if	  it	  
was	  obtained	  through	  the	  implicit	  threat	  of	  force?	  Is	  consent	  ever	  real	  if	  there	  is	  only	  one	  
option	  made	  available?	  	  If	  consent	  was	  not	  real,	  then	  the	  caesarean	  section	  was	  a	  non-­‐
criminal	  battery	  (assuming	  the	  absence	  of	  bad	  faith)	  and	  she	  may	  have	  a	  civil	  case	  against	  
the	  Health	  Service	  for	  trespass	  against	  the	  person.	  	  
	  
The	  Guidelines	  claim,	  referring	  to	  the	  National	  Consent	  Policy,	  [70]	  that	  “the	  general	  
principles	  of	  informed	  consent	  apply	  to	  procedures	  carried	  out	  under	  this	  Act	  in	  the	  same	  
way	  as	  for	  any	  other	  medical	  procedure.”	  [51	  at	  9.1]	  This	  seems	  a	  particularly	  contradictory	  
piece	  of	  policy-­‐writing.	  	  How	  can	  proper	  standards	  of	  informed	  consent	  over	  a	  caesarean	  
section	  operate	  when	  the	  woman	  was	  being	  denied	  the	  alternative	  of	  abortion?	  	  If	  she	  
cannot	  opt	  for	  an	  alternative	  then	  it	  is	  redundant	  to	  suggest	  that	  more	  information	  about	  
the	  option	  she	  wants	  to	  refuse	  somehow	  cures	  the	  problem.	  	  It	  seems	  clear	  that	  the	  
Department	  of	  Health,	  the	  HSE,	  and	  the	  committee	  drafting	  the	  Guidelines	  have	  not	  worked	  
through	  the	  inconsistencies	  between	  pregnancy	  regulation	  and	  normal	  consent	  law	  and	  
policy,	  a	  set	  of	  inconsistences	  which	  AIMS	  has	  raised	  on	  many	  occasions.	  [71]	  	  
	  
3.	  	  Refusing	  an	  abortion	  to	  a	  woman	  who	  is	  at	  risk	  of	  suicide	  may	  not	  be	  a	  reasonable	  action	  
because	  it	  falls	  below	  legal	  standards	  of	  good	  medical	  practice.	  	  	  
	  
The	  woman	  in	  this	  case	  had	  a	  legal	  right	  to	  abortion	  on	  grounds	  of	  suicide	  risk.	  	  The	  norms	  of	  
good	  medical	  practice,	  which	  include	  minimizing	  harms	  to	  her,	  as	  well	  as	  listening	  to	  her	  and	  
taking	  her	  views	  seriously,	  should	  have	  applied	  in	  this	  case.	  [72]	  [73]	  And	  if	  doctors	  acted	  
below	  the	  norms	  of	  good	  medical	  practice	  in	  treating	  her,	  they	  may	  be	  liable	  in	  negligence	  if	  
any	  harm	  resulting	  from	  the	  abortion	  refusal	  was	  caused	  by	  that	  breach	  in	  standards.	  	  
Proving	  that	  the	  abortion	  refusal	  was	  negligent	  care	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  law	  would	  probably	  be	  
difficult	  in	  this	  instance	  since	  negligence	  law	  continues	  to	  adopt	  a	  more	  professional	  
oriented,	  rather	  than	  a	  patient	  oriented,	  standard	  of	  care	  (usually	  known	  in	  common	  law	  as	  
the	  Bolam	  standard,	  see	  Dunne	  v	  National	  Maternity	  Hospital	  [1989]	  IR	  91	  (SC)	  [74]).	  	  	  
	  
More	  importantly,	  the	  professional-­‐oriented	  standard	  that	  it	  adopts	  tolerates	  more	  or	  less	  
any	  level	  of	  skilled	  care	  once	  it	  is	  accepted	  by	  some	  relevant	  professional.	  	  This	  means	  that	  if	  
a	  relevant	  health	  professional	  thinks	  it	  is	  acceptable	  to	  treat	  women	  in	  this	  way,	  then	  it	  is	  
difficult	  to	  prove	  a	  breach	  of	  the	  standard,	  even	  if	  goes	  against	  the	  mainstream	  views	  of	  the	  
profession.	  	  As	  there	  are	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  doctors	  who	  believe	  that	  abortion	  is	  not	  an	  
appropriate	  treatment	  for	  women	  at	  risk	  of	  suicide,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  an	  abortion	  refusal	  
may	  not	  fall	  below	  the	  standard	  as	  set	  by	  ‘a	  body	  of	  professional	  opinion’.	  	  	  
	  
As	  a	  matter	  of	  law,	  to	  find	  that	  the	  abortion	  refusal	  was	  negligent	  care,	  the	  refusal	  would	  
have	  to	  be	  a	  “deviation	  from	  general	  and	  approved	  practice”	  such	  that	  “no	  medical	  
practitioner	  of	  like	  specialization	  and	  skill	  would	  have	  followed	  had	  he	  been	  taking	  ordinary	  
care”.	  	  This	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  prove	  and	  this	  is	  why	  it	  only	  in	  cases	  of	  egregious	  harm	  
such	  as	  Kearney’s,[75]	  where	  a	  symphysiotomy	  was	  performed	  without	  knowledge	  or	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consent	  after	  a	  caesarean	  section,	  that	  patients	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  successful.	  	  Surely	  legal	  
standards	  of	  care	  do	  not	  have	  to	  demand	  that	  patients	  tolerate	  everything	  except	  the	  
completely	  unsupportable.[76]	  	  We	  should	  always	  be	  arguing	  for	  a	  more	  patient-­‐centred	  
perspective	  on	  standards	  of	  care	  in	  medical	  negligence	  law,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  a	  more	  robust	  
consent	  policy.[71]	  
	  
Indeed	  the	  problems	  with	  negligence	  law	  in	  this	  regard	  have	  been	  much	  critiqued.	  [77]	  	  
Many	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  common	  law	  should	  be	  developed	  in	  light	  of	  patients’	  dignitary	  
rights	  to	  be	  free	  of	  non-­‐consensual	  treatment.	  [78]	  	  This	  could	  be	  done	  through	  reliance	  on	  
Convention	  rights,	  UN	  human	  rights	  norms,	  constitutional,	  common	  law	  or	  statutory	  rights	  
in	  their	  protection	  of	  autonomy,	  integrity	  and	  conscience.	  	  And	  indeed	  a	  patient-­‐centred	  
perspective	  is	  having	  more	  of	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  standards	  for	  assessing	  good	  i.e.	  non-­‐
negligent	  treatment.	  	  Irish	  law	  together	  with	  most	  other	  common	  law	  jurisdictions	  has	  
adopted	  a	  ‘reasonable	  patient’	  standard	  in	  the	  context	  of	  medical	  negligence’s	  response	  to	  
the	  issue	  of	  information.	  [79]	  	  If	  the	  courts	  do	  move	  more	  towards	  a	  patient-­‐centred	  
perspective	  in	  all	  aspects	  of	  medical	  negligence	  law,	  then	  care	  which	  fails	  to	  take	  patient’s	  
views	  of	  harm	  seriously	  will	  not	  be	  satisfactory.	  	  As	  Mark	  Murphy	  discussed	  recently,	  [80]	  
‘doctors	  of	  pro-­‐choice	  conscience’	  have	  consistently	  pushed	  clinical	  standards	  more	  towards	  
a	  patient-­‐centred,	  human	  rights	  norm	  as	  they	  argue	  for	  those	  standards	  in	  their	  clinical	  
practice.	  	  If	  medical	  practice	  adopts	  a	  more	  patient-­‐centred	  perspective,	  then	  that	  will	  also	  
push	  the	  standards	  of	  negligence	  law	  more	  towards	  a	  patient-­‐centred	  human	  rights	  norm.	  	  	  
	  
4.	  	  Refusing	  an	  abortion	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  be	  reasonable	  when	  it	  entails	  forms	  of	  cruel,	  inhuman	  
and	  degrading	  treatment	  in	  breach	  of	  international,	  European	  and	  arguably	  domestic	  human	  
rights	  norms.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
If	  women’s	  constitutional	  and	  international	  human	  rights	  are	  legally	  significant,	  then	  the	  
standards	  by	  which	  health	  care	  decisions	  are	  made	  have	  to	  be	  interpreted	  in	  light	  of	  those	  
rights.	  	  The	  HSE	  could	  and	  should	  interpret	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘reasonable’	  in	  light	  of	  human	  
rights	  norms.	  	  The	  ICCPR	  and	  ECHR	  clearly	  recognize	  that	  denying	  abortion	  to	  a	  rape	  victim	  is	  
a	  form	  of	  cruel,	  inhuman	  and	  degrading	  treatment.[55]	  [81]	  Irish	  law	  has	  not	  yet	  taken	  this	  
formal	  step,	  but	  clearly	  it	  should	  if	  it	  wants	  to	  ring	  true	  in	  its	  commitment	  to	  human	  rights	  
and	  ethical	  principles.	  	  The	  women	  and	  couples	  of	  Termination	  for	  Medical	  Reasons	  have	  
argued	  that	  denial	  of	  domestic	  abortion	  care	  to	  women	  carrying	  pregnancies	  with	  fatal	  
foetal	  anomalies	  is	  a	  form	  of	  CIDT.	  	  Again	  their	  arguments	  are	  clearly	  supported	  by	  
international	  and	  European	  human	  rights	  standards.[55]	  [82]	  	  They	  have	  made	  2	  formal	  
complaints	  to	  date	  to	  the	  UNHRC	  [83]	  and	  they	  receive	  a	  lot	  of	  popular	  support	  from	  Irish	  
society.[84]	  	  The	  Irish	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  has	  also	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  failure	  to	  
provide	  abortion	  care	  in	  circumstances	  of	  serious	  risk	  to	  health	  is	  a	  breach	  of	  international	  
human	  rights	  norms	  [40	  at	  para	  21].	  	  In	  2011,	  52%	  of	  general	  practitioners	  questioned	  for	  a	  
research	  led	  survey,	  expressed	  the	  view	  that	  abortion	  should	  be	  available	  to	  women	  who	  
choose	  it.	  [85]	  	  There	  is	  significant	  support	  for	  expanding	  abortion	  provision	  in	  Ireland,	  but	  
the	  Irish	  people	  have	  never	  been	  given	  an	  opportunity	  to	  liberalise,	  rather	  than	  restrict,	  
abortion	  law.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Irish	  domestic	  law	  recognises	  the	  right	  to	  autonomy	  [86]	  and	  the	  right	  to	  bodily	  integrity	  [87]	  
as	  unenumerated	  constitutional	  rights.	  	  Rather	  than	  attempt	  a	  legal	  interpretation	  which	  
would	  evaluate	  how	  such	  rights	  can	  be	  accommodated	  in	  light	  of	  the	  foetal	  right	  to	  life	  
however,	  legal	  authorities	  generally	  seem	  to	  assume	  that	  women’s	  constitutional	  rights	  are	  
suspended	  during	  pregnancy.	  	  Women’s	  constitutional	  rights,	  albeit	  as	  limited	  by	  Article	  40	  3	  
3	  in	  the	  context	  of	  pregnancy,	  could	  however	  be	  interpreted	  in	  light	  of	  European	  and	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international	  human	  rights	  norms	  to	  exclude	  anything	  which	  amounts	  to	  CIDT.	  	  I	  would	  
argue	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  exclude	  CIDT	  is	  to	  respect	  the	  consent	  rights	  of	  pregnant	  women	  
more	  generally.	  	  This	  would	  avoid	  a	  situation	  where	  rape	  survivors,	  women	  who	  are	  
seriously	  ill,	  and	  women	  distressed	  by	  fatal	  foetal	  anomalies	  among	  others,	  may	  be	  harmed	  
further	  by	  being	  scrutinised	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  whether	  they	  meet	  ‘exceptional	  grounds’	  for	  
abortion.	  [88]	  	  Nonetheless,	  at	  minimum	  the	  HSE	  panel	  could	  have	  chosen	  to	  interpret	  
‘practicality	  and	  reasonableness’	  as	  excluding	  the	  imposition	  of	  CIDT.	  	  But	  it	  didn’t.	  	  Instead	  
it	  appears	  to	  have	  interpreted	  reasonableness	  and	  practicality	  as	  ensuring	  the	  delivery	  of	  a	  
viable	  foetus	  against	  a	  woman’s	  will	  and	  as	  forcibly	  hydrating	  a	  woman	  who	  has	  already	  
been	  violated	  through	  rape	  and	  is	  vulnerable	  as	  an	  asylum	  seeker.	  	  	  
	  	  
Conclusion	  
The	  case	  has	  been	  reported	  in	  the	  Irish	  media,	  who	  have	  commented	  that	  the	  baby	  is	  doing	  
well.	  	  This	  seems	  unlikely	  given	  birth	  at	  25	  weeks	  gestation	  approx.	  It	  provides	  another	  
problematic	  example	  of	  ‘bare	  life’	  being	  represented	  as	  wellness.	  	  Since	  August,	  the	  life	  of	  
Ms	  Y	  continues	  to	  be	  reported	  in	  the	  Irish	  media	  in	  ways	  that	  should	  make	  us	  
uncomfortable.	  	  Why	  should	  this	  woman’s	  story,	  like	  the	  story	  of	  too	  many	  before	  her,	  have	  
to	  do	  the	  work	  of	  holding	  the	  state	  to	  account?	  	  Irish	  society	  at	  home	  and	  abroad	  has	  
objected	  to	  the	  cruel	  treatment	  of	  this	  woman	  in	  its	  name.	  [89][90]	  	  But	  we	  also	  have	  to	  
move	  the	  public	  gaze	  away	  from	  her	  life	  circumstances	  and	  towards	  public	  officials	  who	  
need	  to	  be	  held	  to	  account.	  	  The	  challenge	  will	  be	  to	  do	  so	  in	  a	  way	  which	  helps	  rather	  than	  
hinders	  those	  within	  the	  state	  who	  are	  pushing	  for	  better	  protection	  of	  reproductive	  rights	  
and	  those	  who	  work	  with	  the	  state	  to	  develop	  more	  ethical	  practices.	  	  	  
	  
The	  Coalition	  to	  Repeal	  the	  Eighth	  Amendment	  has	  acquired	  new	  momentum.[91]	  [92]	  	  Civil	  
society	  organisations	  are	  co-­‐operating	  across	  the	  full	  range	  of	  social	  justice	  issues	  as	  the	  
links	  between	  freedom	  from	  deportation,	  access	  to	  healthcare,	  and	  respect	  for	  women’s	  
contributions	  are	  increasingly	  visible.	  	  Justice	  for	  Magdalenes	  [93]	  and	  Survivors	  of	  
Symphysiotomy	  [94]	  provide	  shining	  examples	  of	  gender	  justice	  campaigns	  which	  have	  
sought	  redress	  and	  accountability	  for	  women’s	  mistreatment	  while	  rejecting	  calls	  to	  
sensationalise	  and	  personalise	  that	  history.	  	  There	  is	  still	  a	  long	  way	  to	  go	  before	  we	  get	  
proper	  state	  acknowledgement	  that	  life	  means	  more	  than	  bare	  biological	  existence	  and	  that	  
women’s	  contributions	  to	  life	  ought	  to	  be	  valued	  in	  all	  their	  varied	  forms.	  	  But	  I	  for	  one	  find	  
sustenance	  in	  the	  Ireland	  that	  has	  long	  fought	  for	  these	  goals	  within	  and	  without	  the	  public	  
gaze.	  [95]	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